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Investment Contracts
JAMES D. GORDON III*
Under the federal securities laws, an investment contract is: (1) an
investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with an expectation of
profits; (4) solely from the efforts of others. However, the federal circuit
courts of appeal are fractured over the definition of a "common
enterprise. "
This Article argues for a "multiple investors " test for a common enterprise.
Under this test, a common enterprise is an enterprise in common among the
promoter and multiple parallel investors. The multiple investors test
corresponds to the disclosure policy of the securities acts because it asks
which contracts should have enhanced disclosure rather than the level of
disclosure required by other statutes and the common law for most
contracts. In addition, the multiple investors test helps determine which
promissory notes are securities.
The Article also argues that the Supreme Court case of SEC v. Edwards
should significantly affect the debate over the definition of a common
enterprise. In addition, the Article demonstrates that the combination of
several key Supreme Court cases strongly points to the multiple investors
test.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Investment contracts" are securities covered by the federal securities
acts, along with stocks, bonds, and certain other instruments.1 The Supreme
Court defined investment contracts in SEC v. WJ Howey Co. 2 An
investment contract is: (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common
enterprise; (3) with an expectation of profits; (4) solely3 from the efforts of
1 Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate
of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). Section 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a similar, although slightly different,
definition. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006).
The Supreme Court has observed that the two definitions are "virtually identical."
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985). Similar definitions of
securities appear in § 2(36) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and § 80b-2(a)(18)
of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(36), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (2006); Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).
2 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 301 (1946).
3 Lower courts have since held that "solely" should not be interpreted literally.
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th Cir.
1988) (citing cases from eight other circuits). It is sufficient if the profits come
predominantly from the efforts of others. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545
(D.C. Cir. 1996); SEC v. Int'l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
It is also sufficient if the efforts of others are "the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)). In United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, the Supreme Court stated, "The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
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others. 4 However, the federal circuit courts of appeal cannot agree on the
definition of a "common enterprise." 5
The circuits are not only split; they are fractured. Some circuits use
horizontal commonality, which is a pooling of investor contributions, and,
according to some courts, a pro rata sharing of profits.6 Other circuits use
vertical commonality, which has two versions. Broad vertical commonality
requires that the investor's fortunes depend on the promoter's efforts.7 By
contrast, narrow vertical commonality requires that the investor's profits be
tied to the manager's profits-i.e., they must rise and fall together.8 To make
matters more complex, some circuits require one approach, some circuits
accept one approach but have not ruled on others, one circuit uses two
approaches, and one circuit uses a completely different approach. 9
Commentators are also divided, advocating horizontal commonality, 10 broad
vertical commonality, 1 narrow vertical commonality, 12 either horizontal or
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975). At the same time, the Court stated that it expressed no view about the holding in
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises. Id. at 852 n. 16.
4 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 301 (1946).
5 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Mordaunt v. Incomco, a case raising the
common enterprise issue in connection with a discretionary trading account. 686 F.2d
815 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding no common enterprise), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985).
Three justices dissented, urging the granting of review in light of the "clear and
significant split" among the federal circuits on the commonality issue. 469 U.S. at 1117
(White, J., dissenting).
6 See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
10 Christopher L. Borsani, A "Common" Problem: Examining the Need for Common
Ground in the "Common Enterprise" Element of the Howey Test, 10 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 1,
14-17 (2008); Todd M. Tippett, Comment, Game When They Win; Investment When
They Lose: SECv. SG, Ltd., 7 CoMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 313, 318-19 (2003).
11 Lloyd J. Bandy, Jr., Comment, Securities Regulation-Investment Contracts and
the Common Enterprise Requirement, 43 Mo. L. REV. 779, 786-87 (1978); Stephen M.
Maloney, Comment, What is a Common Enterprise? A Question of Legislative Intent, 11
Miss. C. L. REV. 125, 137 (1990).
12 Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, What Is a Common Enterprise? Horizontal and
Vertical Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 CuMB. L. REV. 323, 350-
52 (1989); William L. Doerler, Comment, SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.: An Extended
Interpretation of the Howey Test Finds that Viatical Settlements Are Investment
Contracts, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 253, 270 (1997); Rodney L. Moore, Note, Defining an
"Investment Contract": The Commonality Requirement of the Howey Test, 43 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1057, 1082-86 (1986).
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vertical commonality, 13 and other approaches. 14
I have previously proposed a multiple investors test for a common
enterprise. 15 Under this test, a common enterprise is an enterprise that is in
common among the promoter and multiple parallel investors. I believe that
the multiple investors test corresponds better to the disclosure policy of the
securities acts than do the other definitions of a common enterprise. I have
also argued that the Howey test, as modified by the multiple investors
definition of a common enterprise, is a meaningful test for determining
which promissory notes are securities, 16 and that the Supreme Court
essentially adopted this test in Reves v. Ernst & Young. 17
The Supreme Court case of SEC v. Edwards18 should significantly affect
the debate over the definition of a common enterprise. In Edwards, the Court
held that a payphone sale-and-leaseback arrangement with a fixed return
could be an investment contract. 19 The case did not address the definition of
a common enterprise. Nevertheless, this Article will argue that Edwards
implies the death of narrow vertical commonality and casts substantial doubt
on horizontal commonality. The Article will also demonstrate that the
13 2 Louis Loss ET AL., SECuRITIEs REGULATION 937-39 (4th ed. 2007) (either
horizontal or narrow vertical commonality); Susan G. Flanagan, Comment, The Common
Enterprise Element of the Howey Test, 18 PAC. L.J. 1141, 1158-60 (1987) (either
horizontal, broad vertical, or narrow vertical commonality); Kyle M. Globerman, Note,
The Elusive and Changing Definition of a Security: One Test Fits All, 51 FLA. L. REV.
271, 287-88 (1999) (either horizontal or vertical commonality); Maura K. Monaghan,
Note, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enterprise Element of Investment
Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2171-74 (1995) (either horizontal or
narrow vertical commonality).
14 Marc G. Alcser, Comment, The Howey Test: A Common Ground for the Common
Enterprise Theory, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1217, 1238-41 (1996) (a common enterprise
should exist when there is an investment for profit in which the success of investors
correlates with either the success of other investors or the success of a promoter); Park
McGinty, What Is a Security?, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1033, 1089 (investment contracts
should require "either a. multiple investors relying predominantly on the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, or b. one or more investors relying solely on the efforts of the
promoter or a third party").
15 James D. Gordon III, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual
Theory for Defining Investment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 635
[hereinafter Gordon, Common Enterprise].
16 James D. Gordon IH, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as
Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 402 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Interplanetary
Intelligence]; Gordon, Common Enterprise, supra note 15, at 679-81.
17 494 U.S. 56 (1990); Gordon, Interplanetary Intelligence, supra note 16, at 394-
404.
18 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
19 Id. at 397.
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combination of several key Supreme Court cases strongly points to the
multiple investors test for a common enterprise.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
The securities markets are essential to America's economy and financial
health. Securities such as stocks and bonds are a primary means through
which businesses raise capital. Many people invest in securities to save
money and earn a return in order to prepare for retirement or meet other
financial objectives. Before the 1930s, securities were governed only by state
law (the state "blue sky laws").20 However, after the stock market crash of
1929, Congress passed comprehensive legislation regulating securities. The
two most important acts are the Securities Act of 193321 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.22 These acts apply to most purchases and sales of
securities in the United States.
The securities acts are in large measure designed to provide enhanced
disclosure to investors, either directly or through the specific and general
deterrent effects of civil,23 criminal, and administrative remedies. First, the
acts require the registration of publicly offered securities with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the use of a prospectus, unless the
security or transaction is specifically exempted. 24 The prospectus discloses
the risks and includes material information about the issuer, the securities
offered, and the industry in which the issuer operates. 25
Second, the securities acts provide civil remedies for fraud which are
more protective of victims than is common law fraud. Generally, the
elements of common law fraud are a material misrepresentation (an omission
qualifies if there is a duty to disclose, a half-truth, or certain other factors), 26
made with knowledge (or a reckless disregard) of its falsity, an intention to
20 The first state securities act was enacted by Kansas in 1911. THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 18 (6th ed. 2009). The state statutes are called
"blue sky laws" because, it was said, they were aimed at "speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky."' Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539, 550 (1917).
21 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006).
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1-37, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
23 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 29, 35 (1959); Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43
YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1933).
24 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
25 See 1933 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j; 1933 Act Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
Schedule A (2006).
2 6 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 738-39
(5th ed. 1984).
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induce the victim to rely, justifiable reliance by the victim, and damages.27
While some securities provisions include certain of these elements and add
other elements, in general the securities acts lower the requirements for
recovery. For example, issuers are strictly liable for misrepresentations and
omissions in registration statements. 28 Other sections of the securities acts
impose liability for negligence and shift the burden of proof on that issue to
the defendant. 29 The plaintiff's burden of proof under other sections is a
preponderance of the evidence, in comparison with clear and convincing
evidence for common law fraud. 30 Some sections relax or eliminate the
requirement of proving reliance, 31 and the common law defense of in pari
delicto is more limited.32 The class of defendants is expanded,33 and there is
27 See generally id. at 725-70. This statement is a generalization; some elements are
modified or qualified in some jurisdictions. Id. at 728.
28 1933 Act § 1 l(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1) (2006); see 1933 Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77f(a) (2006) (issuer must sign registration statement).
29 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006); 1933 Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2)
(2006).
30 E.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-91 (1983) (citing
Rule 10b-5).
31 Reliance is not required under § 11 of the 1933 Act (except that the plaintiff must
not have known of the untruth or omission), unless the plaintiff acquired the security after
the issuer has made generally available to its security holders an earning statement
covering a period of at least 12 months beginning after the effective date of the
registration statement. 1933 Act § 1 l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006). However, even this
reliance may be established without proof that the plaintiff read the registration
statement. Id. Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act does not require reliance, except that the
purchaser must not have known of the untruth or omission. 1933 Act § 12(a)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006). In omissions cases under Rule lOb-5, positive proof of reliance
is not required. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). In
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court said that Affiliated Ute
created a rebuttable presumption of reliance if there is an omission of a material fact by
one with a duty to disclose. 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). Also, in a Rule lOb-5 action, when
materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well
developed market for securities, a rebuttable presumption arises that the plaintiff relied
on the integrity of the market. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 229-30, 241-42
(1988). This is called the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id.
32 See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632-39 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,
Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315-16 (1985).
33 Under § 11 of the 1933 Act, signers of the registration statement, directors,
experts, and underwriters are generally liable unless they sustain the burden of proof that
they had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe that
the statements were true and that no material omissions existed. 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k (2006). These persons are liable for misrepresentations and omissions in statements
purporting to be made on the authority of an expert other than themselves if they had no
reasonable ground to believe and did not believe that the statements were untrue or that
the omissions existed. Id. Controlling persons of violators can also be liable. 1933 Act
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nationwide service of process. 34 Also, the acts create federal court
jurisdiction, allowing invocation of the federal class action provisions. 35
Third, the securities acts provide public protection in the form of criminal
liability,36 governmental injunctions, 37 and administrative remedies. 38
III. THE HOWEY TEST
"Securities" are defined broadly under the federal securities laws. In the
securities acts, Congress did not attempt to articulate the relevant economic
criteria for identifying securities; rather, it simply set forth lists of securities.
Its purpose was to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of
a security."' 39 These definitions include the term "investment contract," a
term which originated in the state securities acts which were enacted before
the federal securities acts.
The leading case regarding the definition of investment contracts is SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co.40 In that case the promoter offered tracts in a citrus grove
coupled with a ten-year service contract under which an affiliate of the
promoter would cultivate the groves and harvest and market the fruit.41 Upon
full payment the land would be conveyed to a purchaser by warranty deed.42
The service company was paid a specified fee plus the cost of labor and
§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2006); 1934 Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). Furthermore,
Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act makes liable any person who offers or sells a security by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails, by means of any material misrepresentation or omission,
unless he or she sustains the burden of proof that he or she did not know and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the misrepresentation or omission.
1933 Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006). Liability under § 12 also extends to a
person who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to
serve his or her own financial interests or those of the securities owner. See Pinter, 486
U.S. at 641-54 (addressing § 12(a)(1)).
34 1933 Act § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006); 1934 Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(2006).
35 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
36 E.g., 1933 Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006); 1934 Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff
(2006).
37 1933 Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006); 1934 Act § 21(d)(l), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(1) (2006).
38 HAZEN, supra note 20, at 271-72.
39 H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933).
40 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
41 Id. at 295.
42 Id.
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materials, and was given full discretion and authority over cultivation,
harvesting, and marketing. 43 The company was accountable for an allocation
of net profits based on a check made at harvest time.44 Forty-two purchasers
invested in the citrus groves.45
The Court held that the arrangements were investment contracts, and
thus were covered by the federal securities acts. 46 The Court defined an
investment contract as "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."' 47 It stated that this
definition had been "crystallized" in the state court cases which preceded the
passage of the federal acts. 48 The Court observed that the term "had been
broadly construed by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full
measure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis
was placed on economic reality."'49 The Court stated that its definition of
investment contracts "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits." 50
The Howey test requires that the money be invested in a common
enterprise. 51 However, Howey did not explain this prong of the test, and the
federal circuit courts of appeal disagree on what constitutes a common
enterprise. There are three basic definitions. Horizontal commonality focuses
on the horizontal relationship among investors. It requires an enterprise in
which the investors' contributions are pooled, 52 and the fortune of each
43 Id. at 296.
44Id.
45 Id. at 295.
46 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946).
4 7 d. at 298-99.
4 8 Id. at 298.
49 Id.
5 0 Id. at 299.
51 Id. at 298-99.
5 2 E.g., SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2000); Wals v.
Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994); Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18
F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994); Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F.2d 278, 281-82
(6th Cir. 1989); Hart v. Pulte Homes of Michigan Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir.
1984); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir.
1982); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174,
1183 (6th Cir. 1981); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v.. Agri-
Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-79 (7th Cir. 1972).
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investor depends on the success of the overall venture. 53 Some courts also
require a pro rata sharing of the profits and losses derived from the pooled
funds.54
By contrast, vertical commonality focuses on the vertical relationship
between the investor and the promoter. The vertical test defines a common
enterprise as one in which the investor is dependent on the promoter's efforts
or expertise for the investor's returns. 55 Broad and narrow versions of
vertical commonality exist. The broad version requires that the investor's
fortunes be tied to the efficacy of the manager's efforts.56 By comparison,
narrow vertical commonality requires that the investor's profits be tied to the
manager's profits-i.e., they must rise and fall together. 57 An arrangement in
which the manager is paid a fixed fee lacks narrow vertical commonality. 58
Similarly, a discretionary stock or commodities trading account lacks narrow
53 E.g., Revak, 18 F.3d at 87; Deckebach, 867 F.2d at 282; Hart, 735 F.2d at 1004;
SEC v. Prof. Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 354 (6th Cir. 1984); Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 651
F.2d at 1183; Curran, 622 F.2d at 223-24.
54 E.g., Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d at 187-88; Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc.,
741 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1984); see SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 614
(D.C. Cir. 2000); SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Hocking
v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1459 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Wals, 24 F.3d at 1019
(requiring that the investors obtain "an undivided share in the same pool of assets and
profits").
55 E.g., SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 732 (1 1th Cir. 2005); SEC v.
ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (11 th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds sub nom., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); SEC v.
Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1999 (11 th Cir. 1999); Eberhardt v. Waters,
901 F.2d 1578, 1580-81 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140-
41 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 1986); Villeneuve
v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11 th Cir. 1983) (en banc); SEC
v. Cont'l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973).
56 E.g., Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d at 1199-1200; Revak, 18 F.3d at 87-
88; Eberhardt, 901 F.2d at 1580-81; Cont'l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522; Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 479; Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d at 140-41.
5 7 E.g., Revak, 18 F.3d at 88; SEC v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1340-41
(9th Cir. 1994); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76, 82 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 638
F. Supp. 4, 7 (D. Mass. 1985), aff'don other grounds, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986); Shotto
v. Laub, 635 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Md. 1986); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F.
Supp. 1225, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
58 See Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d at 140-41.
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vertical commonality if the broker is paid commissions based on the
frequency of transactions rather than on the profitability of the account.59
The circuit courts of appeal are profoundly divided over the definition of
a common enterprise. The Third, 60 Sixth, 61 and Seventh 62 Circuits require
horizontal commonality. 63 By contrast, the Fifth 64 and Eleventh 65 Circuits
use broad vertical commonality. The First,66 Fourth,67 and D.C. 68 Circuits
accept horizontal commonality but have not ruled on vertical commonality.
The Second Circuit accepts horizontal commonality, rejects broad vertical
commonality, and has not ruled on narrow vertical commonality. 69 The Ninth
59 E.g., Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982); Brodt, 595 F.2d at
461. For a discussion of discretionary trading accounts managed by securities and
commodity brokers, see Harvey Bines & Steve Thel, Investment Management
Arrangements and the Federal Securities Laws, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1997).
60 Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir.
1982). In 2000 the Third Circuit declined to decide whether vertical commonality
suffices. SEC v. Infinity Group, 212 F.3d 180, 187-88 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000).
61 Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 394 (6th Cir. 1989);
Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F.2d 278, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1989); Hart v. Pulte
Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 100i, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984); Union Planters Nat'l Bank
v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir. 1981); Curran v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on
other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
62 Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1994); Hirk v. Agri-
Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-79 (7th Cir. 1972). In SEC v. Lauer, the Seventh
Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction on the ground that an investment contract
probably existed even though there was only one investor, because the promoter
apparently represented that the investment would be pooled with others. 52 F.3d 667,
670-71 (7th Cir. 1995).
63 Wals, 24 F.3d at 1018; Deckebach, 867 F.2d at 282; Salcer, 682 F.2d at 460;
Curran, 622 F.2d at 222; Hirk, 561 F.2d at 100-01; Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276-79.
64 Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1989); SEC v. Cont'l
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
65 SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc. 408 F.3d 727, 732 (1 1th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Unique
Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1999-2000 (11th Cir. 1999); Eberhardt v. Waters,
901 F.2d 1578, 1580-81 (11 th Cir. 1990); Villeneuve v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp.,
698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983) (en bane). In SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., the
Eleventh Circuit stated in a footnote that the viatical settlements at issue had both
horizontal and vertical commonality. 408 F.3d 737, 743 n.4 (11 th Cir. 2005).
66 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 50 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001).
67 Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 n.8 (4th Cir. 1994).
68 SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2000); SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
69 Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Circuit recognizes both horizontal commonality and narrow vertical
commonality. 70 The Tenth Circuit has rejected a requirement of horizontal
commonality in favor of an "economic reality" approach.
7 1
To illustrate the differences in the definitions of a common enterprise, let
us suppose that a condominium developer sells condominium units coupled
with management agreements under which the manager will rent the units to
vacationers when the owners are not using them, and will pay each owner a
percentage of the rental proceeds from the owner's unit. The SEC views
these arrangements as investment contracts if "[t]he condominiums, with any
rental arrangement or other similar service, are offered and sold with
emphasis on the economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or arranged for
by the promoter, from rental of the units."72 Indeed, the arrangements have
some similarities to the sale of citrus groves coupled with a management
agreement that were addressed in Howey.73
Under the horizontal commonality approach, these arrangements are not
investment contracts. 74 Horizontal commonality is absent because each
purchaser owns a separate asset, and thus the investment funds are not
pooled. Nor is there a pro rata sharing of profits, since each purchaser's
return is based on the rental use of his or her particular unit. Horizontal
commonality would exist if the investors' funds were pooled to buy an entire
70 Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1459 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc). In SEC v. R.G.
Reynolds Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit seemed to say in dicta that broad vertical
commonality would suffice. 952 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991).
71 McGill v. Am. Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 924-25 (10th Cir. 1985).
In Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., purchasers of lots in a real estate development
alleged that "they purchased lots with investment intent, that defendants encouraged
investment purchases by promising the lots would increase in value because of
defendants' activities in developing and providing amenities, and that defendants led
purchasers to believe a trust would be established to construct and operate facilities for
their common benefit." 627 F.2d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 1980). The Tenth Circuit did not
decide whether the arrangements were investment contracts, but it held that plaintiffs'
allegations were sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 1038.
The buyers purchased separate lots. Id. at 1039. However, the court stated, "[A] common
enterprise does not require the sale of undivided interests ....I d.
72 17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988); see also Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1449
(condominiums); Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 192-93 (5th
Cir. 1979), modified on other grounds, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(condominium campsites); Wooldridge Homes, Inc. v. Bronze Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp.
1085 (D. Colo. 1983) (condominiums) (denying motion to dismiss because an investment
contract could be involved). But see Revak, 18 F.3d at 87; Wals, 24 F.3d at 1018.
13 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
74 See Wals, 24 F.3d at 1018; Revak, 18 F.3d at 88; Deckebach v. La Vida Charters,
Inc., 867 F.2d 278, 282-84 (6th Cir. 1989) (yacht leasebacks).
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condominium project and each investor received a proportionate share of the
profits of the entire enterprise.
By contrast, under either vertical commonality approach, the
arrangements are investment contracts. 75 The arrangements have broad
vertical commonality because the investor's fortunes are dependent on the
manager's managerial and entrepreneurial effort and skill in attracting rental
customers and producing income for the investor. The arrangements also
have narrow vertical commonality. Because the manager pays the investor a
percentage of the rental proceeds, the manager's income rises and falls with
the investor's income. On the other hand, if the investor paid the manager a
fixed fee, or if the manager paid the investor a fixed return, the arrangement
would lack narrow vertical commonality.
IV. MARINE BANK V. WEA VER
Vertical commonality does not require a pooling of investment funds or a
pro rata sharing of profits among investors. Therefore, vertical commonality
can exist even when there is only one promoter and one investor, in a unique
one-on-one contract between two parties. However, a Supreme Court case,
Marine Bank v. Weaver,76 held that an individually negotiated profit-sharing
agreement not involving multiple investors was not a security. 77 The
Weavers guaranteed a bank loan to a meat packing company owned by the
Piccirillos, who in return promised to pay the Weavers fifty percent of the
company's net profits and $100 per month.78
The contract had broad and narrow vertical commonality but lacked
horizontal commonality. However, the Court did not explicitly address the
concept of a common enterprise. Instead, the Court focused on the absence of
multiple investors. The Court noted that the "unusual instruments found to
constitute securities in prior cases involved offers to a number of potential
investors, not a private transaction as in this case."' 79 It pointed out that
Howey involved forty-two purchasers, 80 and that in SEC v. C.M Joiner
75 See Cameron, 608 F.2d at 192-93 (condominium campsites); Wooldridge Homes,
Inc., 558 F. Supp. at 1987 (condominiums) (denying motion to dismiss because an
investment contract could be involved).
76 455 U.S. 551 (1982). For criticism of Weaver, see Marc I. Steinberg & William E.
Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Security": The "Context" Clause,
"Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 498-
503 (1987).
77 Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560.
78 Id. at 553.
7 9 Id. at 559.
80 Id. (citing 328 U.S. at 295).
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Leasing Corp.81 (an investment contract case involving assignments of oil
leases), offers were sent to more than 1,000 prospects. 82
The Court also observed, "In C.M Joiner Leasing, we noted that a
security is an instrument in which there is 'common trading.' The
instruments involved in C.M Joiner Leasing and Howey had equivalent
values to most persons and could have been traded publicly."83 The Court
held, "Although the agreement gave the Weavers a share of the Piccirillo's
profits, if any, that provision alone is not sufficient to make that agreement a
security. Accordingly, we hold that this unique agreement, negotiated one-
on-one by the parties, is not a security." 84
Weaver means that broad and narrow vertical commonality between a
promoter and a single investor is not sufficient; there must be multiple
investors or offerees. Larry E. Ribstein has observed, "Marine Bank v.
Weaver supports use of a multiple-investor test." 85 However, because
Weaver did not explicitly address the definition of a common enterprise,
most courts have overlooked the case in the common enterprise debate.
Also, in Weaver and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,86
the Supreme Court essentially added a fifth prong to the Howey test-
whether an alternative regulatory scheme protects investors and thereby
renders application of the securities acts unnecessary. 87
V. AN EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT TESTS
The primary policy of the federal securities acts is investor protection
through disclosure. 88 Therefore, for certain economic arrangements,
81 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
82 Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559-60 (citing 320 U.S. 344, 346 (1943)).
83 Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
84 Id.
85 Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of General
Partnerships, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992) (citation omitted).
86439 U.S. 551 (1979).
87 See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558-59; Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70.
88 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963). The preamble of the 1933 Act declares that it was designed "[t]o provide full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). The Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency reported that the aim of the 1933 Act was "to prevent further
exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities
through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor; to
protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against competition
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Congress required enhanced disclosure through registration, prospectuses,
and other methods, and it provided criminal sanctions and civil remedies to
deter misrepresentations and nondisclosure and to remedy injuries caused by
them.
Congress did not intend the securities laws to apply to all contracts or "to
provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud. '89 Therefore, the definition of
an investment contract should relate to the question about which contracts
should have enhanced disclosure, rather than the level of disclosure required
by other statutes and the common law for most contracts. Consequently, in
defining an investment contract, we should ask which contracts need the
protection of the securities acts.90
Steven J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard have observed:
A policy question lurks in asking whether the instrument in question is a
"security": Should the securities laws apply to the transaction in question?
Why do we apply securities regulations only to certain transactions? Home
purchases, for example, are not covered by the securities laws, even though
they are the most substantial investment that most people make. Your
savings account at the local bank, another large repository of investment
dollars, is not a security. How does a "security" differ from these other
investments? Because securities regulation applies only to transactions in
securities, the question of "what is a security" is in many ways the same as
asking "should we apply securities regulation here?" 9 1
Evaluating the current tests for a common enterprise in light of the disclosure
policy of the securities acts reveals some of these tests' fundamental
weaknesses.
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion." S.
REP. No. 73-47, at 11 (1933); see also H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 3 (1933) ("[T]here should
be full disclosure of every essentially important element attending the issue of a new
security."); H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 1 (1934). The 1934 Act's prohibitions against
manipulation also rest, at least partly, on the philosophy of full disclosure. See Basic, 485
U.S. at 230.
89 Weaver, 455 U.S. at 556; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (citation omitted); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985).
90 Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967).
91 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 89 (2d ed. 2008) (emphasis omitted).
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A. Horizontal Commonality
The horizontal commonality test is flawed because the requirements of
pooling and a pro rata distribution of profits are irrelevant to the question
whether there is a special need for enhanced disclosure. Consider, for
example, the condominium rental arrangement discussed above. 92 The facts
that the condominiums are individually owned and that each investor's return
is calculated independently do not significantly reduce the special risk of
fraud and the need for enhanced disclosure that these arrangements involve.
The buyer lacks access to material information, and the promoter manages
and controls the enterprise. The investor is dependent on the promoter's
future exercise of its managerial and entrepreneurial effort and skill. 93
The form of ownership of the enterprise and the manner of dividing the
profits are largely formal distinctions. As Howey explained, in the pre-1933
investment contract cases, "[florm was disregarded for substance and
emphasis was placed on economic reality." 94 However, the horizontal
commonality test elevates form over substance. Howey stated that its
definition of investment contracts "embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits." 95 Horizontal commonality fails to meet this standard.
Another problem is that horizontal commonality was not present in
Howey itself, because each investor individually owned a separate tract of
land. 96 The Court noted that there was "ordinarily no right to specific
fruit," 97 and that the produce was "pooled, '98 which probably meant that the
fruit was put together for marketing. However, this is not what is usually
92 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
93 See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
94 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,298 (1946).
95 Id. at 299.
96 Every sale was "an out-right sale of a definitely identified tract of land." SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 715-16 n.5 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946);
see also Jerry C. Bonnett, How Common Is A "Common Enterprise"?, 1974 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 339, 349-50 (Howey did not involve horizontal commonality); Louis Loss ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 934 (there was no pooling of investors' funds in Howey); McGinty,
supra note 14, at 1047 ("In Howey, .. . the purchasers arguably were not involved in a
common enterprise. Each Howey purchaser's interests were separate from the others' and
from the Howey companies'. They cost different amounts to purchase and to service."
(citation omitted)).
97 Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.
98Id.
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meant by "pooling" in the horizontal commonality test.99 In addition, Howey
did not involve a pro rata sharing of profits. Instead, each investor's return
was based on the citrus production from his or her own tract. 100 The
investors' independent returns were one reason that the Fifth Circuit found
that Howey did not involve a security,' 0' but the Supreme Court nevertheless
found that that arrangements in Howey constituted investment contracts.10 2
The horizontal commonality test is too narrow, because it excludes many
arrangements in which investors purchase individual assets, but which have
been found to be investment contracts, such as condominium rental
arrangements, animal breeding programs, 103 cattle feeding programs, 104
99 See Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994) (pooling
requires "an undivided share in the same pool of assets and profits"). In Savino v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., the court stated:
"Pooling" has been interpreted to refer to an arrangement whereby the account
constitutes a single unit of a larger investment enterprise in which units are sold to
different investors and the profitability of each unit depends on the profitability of
the investment enterprise as a whole .... Thus, an example of horizontal
commonality involving brokerage accounts would be a "commodity pool," in which
investors' funds are placed in a single account and transactions are executed on
behalf of the entire account rather than being attributed to any particular subsidiary
account. The profit or loss shown by the account as a whole is ultimately allocated
to each investor according to the relative size of his or her contribution to the fund.
Each investor's rate of return is thus entirely a function of the rate of return shown
by the entire account.
507 F. Supp. 1225, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted).
100 "The company is accountable only for an allocation of the net profits based upon
a check made at the time of picking." Howey, 328 U.S. at 296. Each purchaser "looked
for the income from his investment to the fruitage of his own grove and not to the
fruitage of the groves as a whole." Howey, 151 F.2d at 717. The disparity in citrus
production among tracts was real, since purchasers could purchase tracts with one year-
old, two year-old, or five year-old trees (or older). SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp.
440, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff'd, 151 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293
(1946). The yield among tracts could also vary because of disease, insect infestations, and
soil fertility. Bonnett, supra note 96, at 349. These factors could impact disparately on
different tracts, since the service company cared for almost 2,500 acres of citrus groves.
Howey, 60 F. Supp. at 441; see also McGinty, supra note 14, at 1047-48 ("Each Howey
purchaser's interests ... promised a return based solely on the purchaser's crops,
regardless of the fortunes of the other purchasers or of the service company." (citations
omitted)).
101 Howey, 151 F.2d at 717-18, rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
102 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946).
103 See, e.g., Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 919 (4th Cir. 1990)
(cattle); Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1579 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (cattle); Cont'l Mktg.
Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 468 (10th Cir. 1967) (beavers); SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp.
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yacht leaseback programs, 105 railroad car programs, 106 and orchard tract
programs 107 like the one in Howey. The Howey Court cautioned, "The
statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be
thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae."'108
B. Narrow Vertical Commonality
Like the horizontal commonality test, the narrow vertical commonality
test does not relate to the disclosure policy of the acts. For example, under
the narrow vertical commonalty test, a discretionary brokerage account has
vertical commonality if the broker receives a percentage of the account's
profits, but lacks vertical commonality if the broker receives commissions
based solely on the volume of transactions. 109 However, the method of
calculating the broker's compensation is irrelevant to the question of whether
a discretionary brokerage account requires the enhanced disclosure mandated
by the acts. 110 The need for enhanced disclosure depends mostly on the
investor's access to information and on the degree of control exercised by the
873, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (foxes); State v. Robbins, 240 N.W. 456, 457 (Minn. 1932)
(muskrats); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 161 A. 193, 193 (N.J. 1932) (rabbits).
104 E.g., Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 799-807 (E.D.N.C.
1986), affd mem., 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); McLish v. Harris Farms,
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1075, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
105 See James D. Gordon III, Flying Into Blue Sky: Aircraft Leasebacks as
Securities, 35 UCLA L. REv. 779, 806-10 (1988).
106 E.g., Richmond Tank Car Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13618 (Sept. 14,
1978).
107 E.g., SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 648 (S.D. Fla. 1941); SEC v. Tung Corp.,
32 F. Supp. 371, 374 (N.D. Il. 1940); Kerst v. Nelson, 213 N.W. 904, 904 (Minn. 1927)
(vineyard tracts).
108 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
109 Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); Savino v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1238-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
110 Larry E. Ribstein has written, "With respect to vertical commonality, it is not
clear why it matters whether the promoter's gains are proportionate to those of the other
investors." Ribstein, supra note 85, at 21. Similarly, Dennis S. Karjala has written:
Champions of the vertical commonality approach should be called on to explain why
there should be a federal remedy when the account manager has an interest in the
account parallel to that of the investor, and therefore an incentive to work in the
investor's interest, while there is no federal remedy against the manager whose only
return is from a brokerage commission and who therefore has an incentive to chum
the account to the detriment of the investor. What federal policy can possibly
distinguish these cases?
Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the
Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1473, 1508 (1986).
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broker, not on the broker's method of compensation. In part, the narrow
vertical commonality test turns vertical commonality on its head, because it
requires that the broker's remuneration depend on the success of the venture.
The investor needs enhanced disclosure partly because the investor is
dependent on the success of the enterprise. The broker's dependence on the
enterprise is irrelevant, because the broker controls the enterprise.
C. Broad Vertical Commonality
Broad vertical commonality is met when the investor is dependent on the
promoter's efforts or expertise for the investor's returns. Broad vertical
commonality is related to the policy of disclosure. It asks whether the
investor is dependent on the future exercise of the promoter's managerial and
entrepreneurial effort and skill, and this question is relevant to whether
enhanced disclosure is needed. However, the broad vertical commonality test
merely duplicates other prongs of the Howey test. I Broad vertical
commonality is present whenever the first, third, and fourth prongs of the
Howey test are met-i.e., when there is an investment of money with an
expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others. Thus, the broad
vertical commonality test eliminates the common enterprise prong of the
Howey test.
Another problem with the broad vertical commonality test is that it is
overbroad. Because it requires only a commonality of interest between the
two parties to a contract, many profit-sharing or income-sharing contracts
between two parties would constitute securities. For example, shopping
center leases often provide that a retail tenant's rent is a fixed amount plus a
percentage of its gross sales. The broad vertical commonality test would
incorrectly identify the profit-sharing aspect of these leases as investment
contracts. The landlord invests assets (the leased space) 112 in a common
111 Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 1980), affd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76, 82 (E.D.N.C. 1996);
Kaplan v. Shapiro, 655 F. Supp. 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Savino, 507 F.Supp. at 1237-
38 n.11; Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D.
Ohio 1979); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, Rule lOb-5 and the
Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REv. 17, 35-36 (2005) [hereinafter
Loewenstein, The Supreme Court]; Moore, supra note 12, at 1082-83. The Fifth Circuit,
which uses broad vertical commonality, has acknowledged this issue: "We recognize that
under our standard the second and third prongs of the Howey test may in some cases
overlap to a significant degree and that our standard has been criticized for that reason."
Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 141 (5th Cir. 1989).
112 Consideration other than money can satisfy this prong of the Howey test. HAZEN,
supra note 20, at 42; see Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12
(1979).
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enterprise (in which the landlord's return depends on the tenant's success)
and expects profits solely from the tenant's efforts. A sharecropping
agreement under which a tenant farmer gives a fraction of his or her crop to
the landlord also satisfies the test, as does a provision of a contract in which a
store owner promises the store manager a bonus of a percentage of the store's
income or profits. In fact, these arrangements satisfy the narrow vertical
commonality test as well.
Under both vertical commonality tests the tenant, the sharecropper, and
the store manager are issuing securities. However, Congress surely did not
intend to subject them to the criminal penalties or the civil remedies of the
federal securities acts. Neither the landlord nor the store owner needs the
protection of the securities acts, since each has sufficient bargaining power to
obtain disclosure without the mandated disclosure of the acts. Theirs are
really ordinary contracts, and should be subject only to the laws governing
ordinary contractual relations.
In summary, the horizontal and narrow vertical commonality tests are
unrelated to the policy of the acts. The broad vertical commonality test is
related to the policy of the acts, but because other prongs of the Howey test
already screen for the same elements, it eliminates the common enterprise
element of the Howey test. In addition, the broad vertical commonality test is
overbroad.
VI. THE MULTIPLE INVESTORS TEST
I have previously proposed a multiple investors test for a common
enterprise. 113 The multiple investors test defines a common enterprise as an
enterprise in common among the promoter and multiple parallel investors.
The arrangement must contemplate multiple investors; a one-on-one contract
between two parties is insufficient. 114 The parallelism requirement means
that the promoter offers essentially the same instruments to multiple
investors. The multiple investors test is supported by Howey and by the
disclosure policy of the securities acts.
113 Gordon, Common Enterprise, supra note 15, at 636.
114 It is not necessary that multiple investors actually invest, but only that offers be
made to multiple potential investors. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559
(1982) ("The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior cases involved
offers to a number of potential investors, not a private transaction as in this case."
(emphasis added)). In Howey, the Court rejected the promoters' argument that not all the
citrus grove purchasers entered into service contracts, reasoning that "[t]he Securities Act
prohibits the offer as well as the sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities. Hence it is
enough that the respondents merely offer the essential ingredients of an investment
contract." Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added).
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The Howey Court's use of the term "common enterprise" suggests
multiple investors:
[I]ndividual development of the plots of land that are offered and sold
would seldom be economically feasible due to their small size. Such tracts
gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed as
component parts of a larger area. A common enterprise managed by
respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is
therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a
return on their investments. 115
This language suggests that the Court intended a common enterprise to be an
enterprise in which the promoter and multiple investors have a common
interest. The commonality of interest described was apparently not between a
single promoter and a single investor regarding an individual tract of land,
but rather was among the promoter and multiple investors. Howey involved
multiple investors; forty-two purchasers invested in the citrus groves. 116
The disclosure policy of the securities acts supports the multiple
investors test. In determining whether an economic arrangement constitutes a
security, we should inquire whether the arrangement is one that needs or
demands the protection of the securities acts. 117 Since Congress did not
intend the securities laws to apply to all contracts or "to provide a broad
federal remedy for all fraud," 118 the definition of an investment contract
should identify those contracts which have an enhanced need for disclosure.
This need is present when the buyer makes an investment, lacks access to
material information, and is dependent on the managerial control or
entrepreneurial skill of others. 119 The first, third, and fourth prongs of the
Howey test ask whether the buyer is making an investment and is dependent
on the managerial control or entrepreneurial skill of others by asking whether
115 Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
116 Id. at 295.
117 Coffey, supra note 90, at 373.
118 Weaver, 455 U.S. at 556; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
686-87 (1985).
119 See, e.g., SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755 (11th Cir. 2007);
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422-24 (5th Cir. 1981); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F.
Supp. 1214, 1222-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). In United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, the Court observed, "The touchstone is the
presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421 U.S.
837, 852 (1975).
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the buyer invests money and expects profits solely from the promoter's
efforts.
The multiple investors test relates, in a categorical way, to the buyer's
access to information. A buyer's access to material information depends on
the buyer's bargaining power to compel disclosure from the promoter. If the
buyer is only one of many investors entering into standardized form contracts
with the issuer (i.e., buying uniform instruments from the issuer), the buyer's
bargaining power is diluted. The buyer is only one of many prospects with
whom the issuer intends to deal, and the issuer's superior bargaining power is
indicated by its use of its own form contracts offered on a "take it or leave it"
basis. The average buyer lacks bargaining power and the ability to negotiate
for additional information or protection. Therefore, the buyer needs the
securities laws to mandate additional disclosure.120
Under the multiple investors test, a unique, individually negotiated
contract between two parties is not an investment contract. Parties who have
the bargaining power to individually negotiate a one-on-one contract are
protected by their bargaining power to obtain disclosure, as well as by the
general laws governing non-securities. Those laws include civil and criminal
statutes and common law and equitable doctrines regarding fraud. The parties
may sue in tort for common law fraud 121 or negligent misrepresentation. 122
They may also sue for rescission or restitution, even for innocent
120 In Wals v. Fox Hills Development Corp., the Seventh Circuit rejected the
multiple investors test and adhered to the horizontal commonality test. 24 F.3d 1016,
1018-19 (7th Cir. 1994). The court held that the condominium time-sharing and rental
agreements at issue did not constitute investment contracts, because the investors owned
separate time-shares. Id. The court reasoned that the 1933 Act "requires promoters and
issuers to make uniform disclosure to all investors, and this requirement makes sense only
if the investors are obtaining the same thing, namely an undivided share in the same pool
of assets and profits." Id. at 1019. However, whether the investors' share is separate or
undivided is irrelevant to the investors' need for disclosure and the issuer's ability to
provide it. Because the investors are parallel-i.e., the promoter offers essentially the
same instruments to multiple investors-the promoter can provide uniform disclosure. In
Howey, the investors owned individual plots of land. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. Also, SEC v. Edwards casts substantial doubt on horizontal
commonality. See generally 540 U.S. 389 (2004); see infra notes 214-21 and
accompanying text. For an analysis of Wals, see Jonathan E. Shook, Note, The Common
Enterprise Test: Getting Horizontal or Going Vertical in Wals v. Fox Hills Development
Corp., 30 TULSA L.J. 727 (1995).
121 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 26, at 725-70. Parties may also recover punitive
damages for common law fraud. Id. at 9-10; 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 544-46
(2d ed. 1993).
122 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 26, at 745-48; DOBBS, supra note 121, at 544, 554.
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misrepresentations. 123 The parties are protected by the same legal rules that
apply to the vast majority of all economic transactions.
The multiple investors test tries to distinguish paradigmatic one-on-one
contracts from contracts in which one party needs the enhanced disclosure
mandated by the securities acts. It asks whether a buyer's bargaining power
to obtain disclosure is diminished by the presence of multiple investors. 124
In the 1930s the common law and equitable remedies were deemed
inadequate for securities partly because those remedies were developed in the
context of face-to-face transactions, whereas securities are sold and traded
publicly. 125 However, one-on-one, individually negotiated contracts are the
paradigmatic face-to-face transactions for which the common law and
equitable remedies are generally deemed adequate.
Another justification for the multiplicity test is that there is a greater
public interest and a greater federal interest when a larger number of
investors is involved. The regulatory costs imposed on issuers, and in turn
partly on investors and taxpayers, are more justified when the threat of injury
is to the public and not solely to one individual negotiating a unique contract.
Dennis S. Karjala has proposed that "the common enterprise requirement
is not satisfied unless a sufficient number of similar interests are sold in such
form that there is a significant possibility that the interests will be traded in
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979); DOBBS, supra note 121,
at 554-55, 580; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 244, 252-55 (4th
ed. 2004); KEETON, ET AL., supra note 26, at 729-30, 748-49; JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 293 (6th ed. 2009). The Second Restatement of
Torts and a minority of courts recognize liability for damages (i.e., not just rescission or
restitution) for innocent misrepresentations in sales transactions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552C (1976); KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at 748-49. Comment (c) to
Restatement of Torts § 552C states that this rule applies to the sale of securities.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmt. c (1976).
124 The multiple investors test applies to the common enterprise element of the
Howey test for investment contracts. It does not apply to stock, which is a separate
category of securities under the securities acts. 1933 Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l)
(2006). In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, the Court held that the securities acts apply
to the sale of 100 percent of the stock of a company, regardless of a party's need for the
protection of the securities acts. 471 U.S. 681, 696 (1985). The Court reasoned in part
that the acts apply to "stock" which has the usual characteristics of stock, and that
persons trading in traditional stock have a high expectation that their activities are
governed by the securities acts. Id. at 687, 693. I agree that in light of the statutory
language, and for the sake of clarity and expectations, "real" stock should always be a
security, whether or not the protection of the acts is needed in a particular transaction.
However, an investment contract is not like stock; since the definition of "investment
contract" is unclear, the policy of the acts should be consulted in forming the definition.
125 See Shulman, supra note 23, at 231-32 (explaining that privity is required for
rescission).
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the national markets." 126 He has argued that other cases do not present a
sufficient national interest, and therefore the parties should look to state
law. 127 Similarly, Judge Donald P. Lay has stated that vertical commonality,
"which would include within the purview of a common enterprise even
relationships between independent individual 'investors' and a single
'promoter,' is antithetical to the ... Court's notion [in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 28] that the federal securities laws focus on the
protection of broader capital markets." 129 Scott T. FitzGibbon has argued
that, to be a security, an instrument must be eligible to participate in a public
market, and therefore must not be unique. 130
The Supreme Court took a similar approach in Marine Bank v. Weaver.
It reasoned, "The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior
cases involved offers to a number of potential investors, not a private
transaction as in this case." 131 The Court observed, "In C.M Joiner Leasing,
we noted that a security is an instrument in which there is 'common trading.'
The instruments involved in C.M Joiner Leasing and Howey had equivalent
values to most persons and could have been traded publicly." 132 By contrast,
the unique agreement in Weaver was "not designed to be traded publicly."' 133
The Weaver Court cited Scott T. FitzGibbon 134 for the point that the 1934
Act "was adopted to restore investors' confidence in the financial
markets."'135 In addition, as will be discussed below, 136 in Reves v. Ernst &
Young 137 the Court held that a factor in determining whether promissory
notes are securities is whether there is common trading or, alternatively,
whether the notes are offered and sold to a broad segment of the public. 138
126 Kaijala, supra note 110, at 1508-09.
127 Id. at 1508.
128 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
129 SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2002) (Lay, J.,
concurring) (advocating horizontal commonality), rev'd and remanded, SEC v. Edwards,
540 U.S. 389 (2004). Mark J. Loewenstein has observed that "the requirement of
horizontal commonality links the definition of a security to the investor's participation in
broader capital markets-the focus of the federal securities laws." Loewenstein, The
Supreme Court, supra note 111, at 36.
130 Scott FitzGibbon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to
Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 926-29 (1980).
131 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982).
132 Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
133 Id.
134 See FitzGibbon, supra note 130.
135 Weaver, 455 U.S. at 555 n.4.
136 See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
137 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
138 Id. at 66, 68.
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Consistent with my view, Larry E. Ribstein has argued that the presence
of multiple investors is relevant to the disclosure policy of the securities
acts. 139 He has also observed, "Viewed in light of the underlying policy
justifications, the thrust of the horizontal commonality element appears to be
a requirement of multiple investors rather than 'commonality,' or the nature
of sharing among these investors." 140 In addition, Stephen J. Choi and A.C.
Pritchard have stated that, when many investors are involved in an enterprise,
collective action problems make it difficult for investors to coordinate their
demands for disclosure and to hold managers accountable. 141
Horizontal commonality is too narrow, and broad vertical commonality
is too broad. The Howey test, as modified by the multiple investors definition
of a common enterprise, occupies a middle ground between the horizontal
and the broad vertical tests, and it accepts elements from both tests. Like
horizontal commonality, it requires multiple investors. However, it does not
require a pooling of assets or a pro rata sharing of profits, and therefore is
broader than horizontal commonality. It accepts broad vertical commonality
in that the first, third, and fourth prongs of Howey incorporate that concept.
However, it is narrower than the broad vertical test because it requires
multiple investors.
Howey and Weaver support the multiple investors test. This definition of
a common enterprise directly relates to the disclosure policy of the securities
acts. In addition, it corresponds to commonsense notions about which
instruments Congress intended to reach under the securities acts. Under the
multiple investors test, a common enterprise is an enterprise in common
among the promoter and multiple parallel investors.
VII. THE MULTIPLE INVESTORS TEST AND PROMISSORY NoTES
The multiple investors test also offers a solution to the issue of
determining which promissory notes are securities. The securities acts define
securities as, among other things, "any note." 142 It is clear, however, that not
all notes are securities. For example, a simple promissory note representing a
consumer loan or a residential mortgage is not a security.
The salient feature of non-security notes is that a single lender (or a
consortium represented by a lead bank) deals with the borrower and has the
bargaining power to obtain detailed information from him or her. 143 An
139 Ribstein, supra note 85, at 17-18, 22.
140 id. at 22.
141 CHOI & PRrrCHARD, supra note 91, at 89-90, 151, 568-76.
142 1933 Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
143 Judge Eugene A. Wright of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed:
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individual or a business borrowing money from a single lending institution is
the paradigm of a note which is not a security. The lender's bargaining power
to get information is immediately recognized by every borrower who has
filled out a loan application, provided detailed financial information, had his
or her credit history checked, and paid to have the collateral inspected,
appraised, and insured.
Often, the lender's form of promissory note is used. The lender dictates
the terms, and the terms are generally designed to protect the lender's
interests. For some large commercial loans, the parties negotiate non-
standardized terms, but the fact that the borrower cannot dictate the terms
demonstrates the lender's significant bargaining power.
By contrast, corporate bonds are the paradigm of notes which are
securities. The borrower issues standardized form notes to multiple lenders.
The borrower dictates the terms of the notes. Unless a buyer of the bonds is a
large investor, the buyer often lacks the bargaining power to insist on
additional information. The buyer needs the additional disclosure and the
enhanced antifraud remedies that the securities acts provide.
The Howey test, as modified by the multiple investors test for defining a
common enterprise, is also a meaningful test for determining which notes are
securities. Investment contracts and notes are in many ways similar; they are
both subcategories of contracts. The major difference between them is that
investment contracts usually pay a variable return, while notes usually pay a
fixed rate of interest. However, investment contracts can pay a fixed
return, 144 and some notes pay a variable interest rate. 145
I have previously argued that in Reves v. Ernst & Young 14 6 the Supreme
Court essentially adopted the Howey test, with the multiple investors
definition of a common enterprise, to determine which promissory notes are
While banks are subjected to risks of misinformation, their ability to verify
representations and take supervisory and corrective actions places them in a
significantly different posture than the investors sought to be protected through the
securities acts.
In an investment situation, the issuer has superior access to and control of
information material to the investment decision. Rather than relying solely on semi-
anonymous and secondhand market information, as do most investors, the
commercial bank deals "face-to-face" with the promissor. The bank has a superior
bargaining position and can compel wide-ranging disclosures and verification of
issues material to its decision on the loan application.
Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1976) (Wright,
J., concurring).
144 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 397 (2004).
145 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1990).
146Id. at 56.
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securities. 147 In that case, in order to raise money to support its general
business operations, a farmer's cooperative sold promissory notes payable on
demand. 148 The notes paid a variable interest rate and were uncollateralized
and uninsured. 149 The co-op marketed the scheme as an "Investment
Program" and offered the notes to its 23,000 members, as well as to non-
members. 150 At least 1,600 people purchased the notes. 151 The co-op
ultimately went into bankruptcy.' 52 The Supreme Court held that the notes
were securities. 153
The Court adopted the Second Circuit's "family resemblance" test.154 It
held that a note is presumed to be a security, but the presumption can be
rebutted by showing that the note bears a strong family resemblance to
certain categories of instruments that are not securities. 155 However, the
Court stated, "More guidance ... is needed. It is impossible to make any
meaningful inquiry into whether an instrument bears a 'resemblance' to one
of the instruments identified by the Second Circuit without specifying what it
is about those instruments that makes them non-'securities. ' '1 56 It explained
that the list of non-securities can be expanded, and therefore "some standards
must be developed for determining when an item should be added to the
list."157
The Court announced a four-factor test. 158 The first factor is the
motivations of a reasonable seller and buyer.159 The Court explained, "If the
seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business enterprise
or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested primarily in
the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is likely to be a
'security."' 160 By contrast, "[i]f the note is exchanged to facilitate the
purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct for the
147 Gordon, Interplanetary Intelligence, supra note 16, at 394-404.
148 Reves, 494 U.S. at 58.
149 Id. at 58-59.
150 Id. at 59.
151 Id.
1521Id.
153 Id. at 67-70.
15 4 Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-65.
155 Id. at 67.
156 Id. at 65-66 (emphasis omitted).
157 Id. at 66.
158 Id. at 66-67.
159 Id. at 66.
160 Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
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seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other commercial or
consumer purpose, . . . the note is less sensibly described as a 'security." 16 1
The Court stated, "Second, we examine the 'plan of distribution' of the
instrument to determine whether it is an instrument in which there is
'common trading for speculation or investment.I' 1 62 There was no common
trading of the promissory notes in Reves, either on an exchange 163 or over the
counter, because the notes could not be traded. 164 Nevertheless, the Court
found that this factor was met. 165 It held that the notes were "offered and sold
to a broad segment of the public, and that is all we have held to be necessary
to establish the requisite 'common trading' in an instrument."1 66
The third factor is the public's reasonable expectations. 167 The Court
indicated that it would consider instruments to be securities based on the
reasonable perceptions of the public, even when an economic analysis of the
transaction might suggest otherwise. 168 The Court observed, "We have
consistently identified the fundamental essence of a 'security' to be its
character as an 'investment.I' 1 69 The advertisements for the notes in Reves
characterized them as "investments." 170
The fourth factor is "whether some factor such as the existence of
another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument,
thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary."' 171
161 Id
162 Id. (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351, 353 (1943)).
163 Id. at 68.
164 See Brief for Respondent at 39, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)
(No. 88-1480).
165 Reves, 494 U.S. at 68.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 66.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 68-69.
170Id. at 59, 69.
171 Reves, 494 U.S. at 67 (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557, 558 &
n.7, 559 (1982)).
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Therefore, the Reves factors are:
I. Whether the parties are motivated by investment purposes or by
some other commercial or consumer purpose, and whether the buyer
is interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate;
2. Whether the notes are either a. commonly traded, or b. offered and
sold to a broad segment of the public;
3. Whether the public reasonably expects the notes to be securities or
investments; and
4. Whether there is an alternative regulatory scheme or other risk-
reducing factors. 172
The Reves factors parallel the prongs of the Howey test, as modified by
the multiple investors definition of a common enterprise. (I have previously
argued that the "factors" in Reves are probably actually "prongs" of the
test. 173) The first Reves factor asks whether the loan is an investment or
something else. This factor is the same inquiry made by the first prong of the
Howey test-whether there is an investment of money. The first Reves factor
also asks whether the buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is
expected to generate. This inquiry is an elaboration of the third prong of
Howey, which requires that the buyer have an expectation of profits.
Reves said that the second factor is to examine the plan of distribution to
see whether there is common trading. The Court held that it is enough if the
notes are offered and sold to a broad segment of the public. 174 Therefore, the
second factor is similar to the common enterprise prong of Howey under the
multiple investors test.
Reves's third factor is the public's reasonable expectations that the notes
are securities or investments. This factor can be incorporated into the first
and third prongs of the Howey test-whether the seller is offering an
"investment" in which the buyers expect a profit. Traditional analysis under
the Howey test already includes examining the seller's promotional emphasis
and the manner in which the instruments are marketed to see whether a
security is being offered. 175
172 See id. at 66-67.
173 Gordon, Interplanetary Intelligence, supra note 16, at 395-98.
174 Reves, 494 U.S. at 68.
175 See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853-54 (1975); SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 346 & n.3, 347 (1943); Teague v. Bakker, 35
F.3d 978, 986-89 (4th Cir. 1994); Rice v. Branigar Org., 922 F.2d 788, 790 (1lth Cir.
1991); Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 1980); 17
C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988).
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The fourth factor-the existence of an alternative regulatory scheme or
other factors that significantly reduce the risk of the instrument-is an
elaboration of the fifth prong of the Howey test that was adopted in Marine
Bank v. Weaver 176 and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.177
In fact, Reves cited those cases. 178
Therefore, the Reves test tracks the first, second, third, and fifth prongs
of the Howey test, as modified by the multiple investors test. That leaves only
Howey's fourth prong, which requires that the profits be solely from the
efforts of others, unaccounted for. However, this prong will automatically be
satisfied if Reves's first three factors are met: the motives are investment; the
notes are offered and sold to a broad segment of the public; and the public
reasonably expects the notes to be securities or investments. The buyers of
promissory notes issued to a broad segment of the public are passive
investors, and the promoter produces the buyers' return on the notes.
Therefore, the Reves test parallels the Howey test with the multiple
investors definition of a common enterprise. The Court even listed the Reves
factors in basically the same order as the prongs of the Howey test:
Howey
1. An investment of money;
2. in a common enterprise (under
a multiple investors test);
3. with an expectation of profits;
4. solely from the efforts of
others.
5. The absence of an alternative
regulatory scheme.
Reves
1. The motives are investment, not
commercial or consumer.
2. The notes are commonly traded
or are offered and sold to a
broad segment of the public.
3. The public reasonably expects
the notes to be securities or
investments.
4. (This is satisfied if the above
three factors are met.)
5. The absence of an alternative
regulatory scheme or other risk-
reducing factor.
This striking similarity is not a sheer coincidence. The Reves Court said that
the family resemblance test applied "the same factors"' 179 that the Court had
applied in the past. The Reves Court cited investment contract cases to
support the second and fifth factors, and five of the seven cases that the Court
176 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
177439 U.S. 551 (1979).
178 494 U.S. at 67, 69.
179 Id. at 66.
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cited for all the factors were investment contract cases. 180 The Court even
cited Howey itself to explain how the second factor could be met. 181
Although the Court said that it rejected the Howey test for promissory
notes, 182 it relied heavily on investment contract cases in creating the factors.
Ultimately, the Reves test resembles the Howey test with a multiple investors
definition of a common enterprise. 183
VIII. SEC v. EDWARDS
The Supreme Court case of SEC v. Edwards184 should significantly
affect the common enterprise debate. In Edwards, the Court held that a
payphone sale-and-leaseback arrangement with a fixed return could be an
investment contract. 185 The case did not address the definition of a common
enterprise. However, I believe that Edwards implies the death of narrow
vertical commonality and casts substantial doubt on horizontal commonality.
Charles E. Edwards was chairman, chief executive officer, and sole
shareholder of ETS Payphones, Inc.186 The company sold payphones to the
public through independent distributors.1 87 The offers were accompanied by
a five-year leaseback and management agreement. 188 Under the arrangement,
a purchaser paid about $7,000 for a phone. 189 ETS leased the phone back and
paid the purchaser $82 a month, an annual return of fourteen percent. 190 ETS
180 Id. at 66-69 (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557, 558 & n.7, 559
(1982); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295 (1946);
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351, 353 (1943)). The other two cases
that the Reves Court cited involved stock. Id. at 66-68 (citing Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687, 693 (1985); United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 851 (1975)).
181 Reves, 494 U.S. at 68 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295
(1946)).
182 Id. at 64, 68 n.4.
183 For another discussion of the relationship between the Reves factors and the
Howey test, see Marc I. Steinberg, Notes as Securities: Reves and Its Implications, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 675, 679 (1990).
184 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
185Id. at 397.
186Id. at 391.
1871Id.
1881Id.
189Id.
190 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391 (2004).
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selected a site for the phone, installed and maintained the phone, arranged for
telephone service, and collected the revenues. 191
The marketing materials described the payphones as "an exciting
business opportunity," and touted the opportunity for profits. 192 Ten
thousand people invested a total of $300 million in the sale-and-leaseback
arrangements. 193 However, the phones did not produce sufficient revenue for
ETS to make the lease payments, and the company used funds from new
investors to make the payments until it finally filed for bankruptcy. 194
The SEC filed a civil enforcement action, alleging that Edwards had
violated the registration provisions and certain antifraud provisions of the
securities acts. 195 The district court held that the arrangements were
investment contracts and issued a preliminary injunction. 196 However, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed on two grounds. 197 First, the court reasoned that an
investment contract must offer either capital appreciation or a participation in
the earnings of the enterprise, while by contrast this arrangement offered a
fixed rate of return. 198 Second, the court held that because the purchasers had
a contractual entitlement to a return, their return was not derived solely from
the efforts of others, and thus the fourth prong of the Howey test was not
met. 199
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, unanimously
reversed and remanded the case.200 The Court first emphasized the broad
definition of a security: "'Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws
was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by
whatever name they are called.' To that end, it enacted a broad definition of
'security,' sufficient 'to encompass virtually any instrument that might be
191 Id. at 391-92.
192 Id. at 392.
193 Id. at 391.
194 Id. at 392.
195 Id.
196 SEC v. ETS Payphones Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1352-54, 1355 (N.D. Ga.
2000), rev'd, 300 F.3d 1281 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), rev'd and remanded sub nom.,
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004), affd, SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc. 408 F.3d 727
(11 th Cir. 2005).
197 SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1282 (11 th Cir. 2002) (per curiam),
rev'd and remanded sub nom., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
198Id. at 1284-85.
199Md. at 1285.
200 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 397. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that it saw "no
abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that the SEC met its burden of
showing a reasonable probability of success on the jurisdictional question." ETS
Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d at 732-33.
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sold as an investment.' 20 1 The Court noted that the Howey test "'embodies a
flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to
meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use
of the money of others on the promise of profits."' 20 2
The Court observed that when it had held that profits must come solely
from the efforts of others, it had "used 'profits' in the sense of income or
return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the
increased value of the investment. '203 The Court argued that there was "no
reason to distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of
variable returns" since in both cases "the investing public is attracted by
representations of investment income." 204 It also expressed concern about a
potential evasion of the securities laws, since "unscrupulous marketers of
investments could evade the securities laws by picking a rate of return to
promise."205
The Eleventh Circuit relied on Reves v. Ernst & Young 20 6 and United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman20 7 for its conclusion that an investment
contract must offer either capital appreciation or a participation in the
earnings of the enterprise. 208 However, the Edwards Court responded that
"Forman supports the commonsense understanding of 'profits' in the Howey
test as simply 'financial returns on ... investments. "'209 It conceded that
Reves appeared to have mistaken Forman's "illustrative description" of prior
decisions about "profits" for an exclusive list, and concluded that that
"passing dictum" was a misreading of Forman.210
The Court also rejected the Eleventh Circuit's holding that the fourth
prong of the Howey test was not met because the purchasers had a
contractual entitlement to a return.211 The Court noted that it was considering
"investment contracts.' 212 The Court reasoned, "The fact that investors have
201 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 393 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990)).
202 Id. (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).
203 Id. at 394.
2 0 4 Id.
205 Id. at 394-95.
206 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
207 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
208 SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam), rev'd and remanded, SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
209 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 396 (quoting United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 853 (1975)).
210 Id. at 396.
211 Id. at 397.
2 12 Id. (emphasis in original).
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bargained for a return on their investment does not mean that the return is not
also expected to come solely from the efforts of others." 213
Although Edwards addressed the third and fourth prongs of the Howey
test (an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others), the case has
important implications for the common enterprise debate. First, in light of
Edwards, narrow vertical commonality should be dead. Narrow vertical
commonality requires that the profits of the promoter and the investor rise
and fall together. However, Edwards held that an investment contract can
have a fixed return. Therefore, Edwards is flatly inconsistent with narrow
vertical commonality.
Second, Edwards casts substantial doubt on horizontal commonality. A
fixed return is inconsistent with a pro rata sharing of profits, so that aspect of
horizontal commonality, required by some courts, should also be dead. In
addition, the Court emphasized the broad definition of a security. It stated
that Congress "enacted a broad definition of 'security,' sufficient 'to
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment."' 214
However, horizontal commonality is a restrictive test that excludes many
instruments sold as investments. The Court also de-emphasized the form of
the arrangement: "'Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to
regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name
they are called."'' 215 By contrast, horizontal commonality focuses precisely
on the form of the arrangement.
Under the horizontal commonality test, the arrangements in Edwards
would not be investment contracts. 216 Horizontal commonality involves a
2 13 Id.
214 Id. at 393 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)).
215 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 393 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
216 SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1287-88 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (Lay, J.
concurring), rev'd and remanded sub nom., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004). Mark
J. Loewenstein observed, "The facts in Edwards may not satisfy the prevailing concepts
of common enterprise-that there must be horizontal commonality where the investors'
money is pooled." Mark J. Loewenstein, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: Federal Preemption of
Holders' Class Actions, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 209, 214 (2006). Ryan C. Farha wrote:
[I]f the Supreme Court eliminated vertical commonality as a practicable option,
leaving horizontal commonality as the applicable standard, then the fraudulent ETS
scheme.., would not be an investment contract and thus would not be subject to the
federal securities laws. In view of the fraudulent aspects of the ETS operation, such
a result is unlikely. Therefore, the Edwards case indirectly prophesizes that the
scope of the investment contract analysis will not be curbed anytime in the near
future.
Ryan C. Farha, Comment, SEC v. Edwards: An Opportunity to Knock on the Viability of
the Howey Test as the Gatekeeper for the Federal Securities Laws, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 161, 191 (2006).
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pooling of investor contributions and, according to some courts, a pro rata
sharing of profits. However, in Edwards the investors' funds were not
pooled; instead each investor separately owned a payphone.217 Nor was there
a pro rata sharing of profits. Each investor received a fixed return, regardless
of whether the enterprise made profits, and profits were not shared pro rata
with other investors.218
However, if the arrangements were formally structured so that the
investors did not own individual phones and so that they shared the profits
pro rata, the arrangements would be investment contracts. This emphasis on
form is incompatible with Edwards.
The Court noted that the Howey test "'embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits."' 219 By contrast, horizontal commonality is a rigid
test, and is not capable of adaptation to meet various schemes. Indeed, it
would not meet the scheme at issue in Edwards.
The Court also expressed concern about a potential evasion of the
securities laws, since "unscrupulous marketers of investments could evade
the securities laws by picking a rate of return to promise." 220 Similarly,
horizontal commonality permits an evasion of the securities laws by allowing
the promoter to structure the arrangement to lack horizontal commonality, as
this scheme did.
The Court also argued that there was "no reason to distinguish between
promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns," since in both
cases "the investing public is attracted by representations of investment
income." 221 Likewise, there is no reason to distinguish between cases in
which horizontal commonality exists or not, since in both cases the investing
public is attracted to the representations of investment income.
Edwards is consistent with the multiple investors test for a common
enterprise. Ten thousand people invested in the payphone sale-and-leaseback
arrangements, and thus the arrangements satisfied the multiple investors test.
On the other hand, some language in Edwards could be interpreted as not
supporting the multiple investors test. The Court emphasized the broad
definition of securities; the multiple investors test is broader than horizontal
commonality but narrower than broad vertical commonality because it
requires multiple investors. In addition, the Court emphasized that the
securities acts were designed to regulate "investments," and it is true that
217 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391-92 (2004).
2 18 1d. at 391.
219 Id. at 393 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).
220Id. at 394-95.
221 Id. at 394.
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one-on-one investments can exist. However, Marine Bank v. Weaver held
that such arrangements are not investment contracts. 222
Moreover, Edwards stated that Congress "enacted a broad definition of
'security,' sufficient 'to encompass virtually any instrument that might be
sold as an investment.' 223 Normally, we do not consider a unique,
individually negotiated contract to be an instrument that is "sold" to one of
the parties to the agreement. By contrast, we do consider a company that
issues uniform instruments to multiple investors to be "selling" investment
contracts. The same is true regarding promissory notes. A company that
borrows money from a single lender is not considered to be "selling" a
promissory note,224 but a company that issues uniform promissory notes to
multiple investors is considered to be "selling" promissory notes. This
understanding is reflected in Reves, in which the Court stated that the notes
were "offered and sold to a broad segment of the public, and that is all we
have held to be necessary to establish the requisite 'common trading' in an
instrument." 225 Individually negotiated contracts are considered to be
"agreed on" by the parties, while uniform instruments issued to multiple
investors are considered to be "sold" to investors.
Therefore, Edwards should significantly affect the common enterprise
debate. Edwards should mean the end of narrow vertical commonality, since
its holding is flatly inconsistent with that approach. In addition, Edwards
casts substantial doubt on horizontal commonality. A fixed rate of return is
inconsistent with a pro rata sharing of profits, so that aspect of horizontal
commonality should be dead. In addition, the Court's emphasis on a broad
and flexible definition of investment contracts is fundamentally incompatible
with horizontal commonality. By contrast, the multiple investors test is
consistent with Edwards. The case also supports the proposition that the test
for investment contracts and promissory notes should be the same. The
investment contracts in Edwards paid a fixed rate of interest and thus were
similar to promissory notes.
IX. CONCLUSION
Under the multiple investors test, a common enterprise is an enterprise
that is in common among the promoter and multiple parallel investors. The
222 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982).
223 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young,
494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990)).
224 See McGinty, supra note 14, at 1101 ("Intuitively, it seems mistaken to think of
a bank as purchasing a security when it takes the borrower's note as evidence of the
loan.").
225 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 68 (1990) (emphasis added).
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multiple investors test corresponds to the disclosure policy of the securities
acts, because it asks which contracts should have enhanced disclosure rather
than the level of disclosure required by other statutes and the common law
for most contracts. The Howey test for investment contracts, with the
multiple investors definition of a common enterprise, is also a meaningful
test for determining which promissory notes are securities. In fact, Reves
essentially adopted this test for promissory notes.
Edwards should affect the definition of a common enterprise. The Court
expressly rejected the requirement of a variable return to investors, which is
an essential element of narrow vertical commonality. Also, the Court held
that an investment contract can have a fixed return, which is inconsistent
with a pro rata sharing of profits-one aspect of horizontal commonality. In
addition, the Court emphasized a broad and flexible definition for securities,
which is incompatible with horizontal commonality. Analytically, Edwards
should mean the death of narrow vertical commonality and of the
requirement of a pro rata sharing of profits under horizontal commonality.
Moreover, Edwards casts substantial doubt on the whole concept of
horizontal commonality.
The combination of Howey, Weaver, Reves, and Edwards strongly points
to the multiple investors test for a common enterprise. Howey's use of the
term "common enterprise" suggested multiple investors, and Weaver
required multiple investors. Reves cited common trading or an offering to a
broad segment of the public, both of which involve multiple investors.
Edwards also involved multiple investors. By contrast, the pattern of cases is
inconsistent with the major alternative tests. The investments in Howey and
Edwards lacked horizontal commonality. Weaver demonstrated that broad
vertical commonality and narrow vertical commonality are insufficient.
Edwards rejected an essential element of narrow vertical commonality and
one aspect of horizontal commonality. The multiple investors test is the path
that runs through the cases.
Grounded in both policy and precedent, the multiple investors test is a
promising solution to the definition of a common enterprise.
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